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Damache v. Minister for Justice [2020] IESC 632 concerned a constitutional challenge to s.19 
of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (the 1956 Act). This section outlined the 
statutory process the executive branch - acting through the Minister for Justice (the Minister) - 
had to follow before revoking a certificate of naturalization. There were two grounds of 
challenge brought before the Supreme Court. First, the appellant argued the revocation of 
citizenship was a judicial power that could only be constitutionally exercised by the judiciary 
and not the executive branch. Second, the appellant argued the statutory process by which 
citizenship is revoked was an unconstitutional breach of fair procedures. Specifically, that it 
was a breach of the principle of Nemo Iudex in Causa Sua – that no one may be a judge in his 
own case (Nemo Iudex principle).  
 
The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s first argument, finding that the revocation of 
citizenship was an executive and not a judicial function, drawing heavily on Ireland’s historical 
link with UK constitutionalism in the process. The Supreme Court proceeded to find in favour 
of the appellant’s second point, holding that the fact the Minister both initiated the proposal to 
revoke and made the final decision to confirm or dismiss the proposal, was contrary to fair 
procedures.  
 
The judgement will be of interest to Irish and foreign public lawyers for its treatment of fair 
procedures, which the Court approached in a regrettably blinkered way – seeing only one 
constitutional principle when several others were at stake. The Supreme Court’s treatment of 
fair procedures effectively demands the diffusion of this executive function to non-executive 
actors, a resolution which will erode a core textual commitment of the Irish Constitution: the 
vesting of executive power in the Government. The judgment is a stark reminder for both Irish 
and comparative lawyers of the fact the concrete demands of fair procedures must be balanced 
with a range of competing institutional goods and principles equally important to constitutional 
democracies: from administrative efficiency to structural principles stemming from the 
separation of powers. Part I outlines the factual background to proceedings, part II outlines the 
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PART I: FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The appellant was born in Algeria and is an Algerian national by birth. He came to Ireland in 
July 2000 and unsuccessfully claimed asylum. In 2002, the appellant married an Irish citizen 
by birth and successfully applied for citizenship in 2006 on the basis of this marriage. In 2008, 
the appellant became naturalised as an Irish citizen pursuant to s.17 of the 1956 Act and 
subsequently made a declaration of fidelity to the State in the District Court. While resident in 
Ireland the appellant became involved with terrorism related activities and was eventually 
extradited to the US and convicted of terrorist offences in Federal court. After being convicted 
he was informed by the Minister of her intention to revoke his citizenship pursuant to s.19 
(1)(b) of the 1956 Act.3 
 
Article 9.1.2 of the Irish Constitution provides that the ‘acquisition and loss of Irish nationality 
and citizenship shall be determined in accordance with law.’ Article 9.3 states that ‘fidelity to 
the nation and loyalty to the state are fundamental political duties of all citizens.’ The 1956 Act 
gives concrete effect to these provisions by providing a statutory regime for the acquisition and 
loss of citizenship. S.19(1)(b) provides that the Minister may revoke a certificate of 
naturalisation if she is satisfied inter alia, that ‘the person to whom it was granted has, by any 
overt act, shown himself to have failed in his duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the 
State.’   
 
However, s.19(2) provides that before a decision to revoke a certificate of naturalisation is 
made the Minister shall first give ‘notice of her intention to revoke the certificate, stating the 
grounds therefor and the right of that person to apply to the Minister for an inquiry as to the 
reasons for the revocation.’ S.19(3) subsequently provides that if an application is made for an 
inquiry under subsection (2) the Minister ‘shall refer the case to a Committee of Inquiry 
appointed by the Minister consisting of a chairman having judicial experience and such other 
persons as the Minister may think fit, and the Committee shall report their findings to the 
Minister.’ 
 
Before the Minister decided to invoke these provisions against Mr Damache, they had lain 
dormant since 1956. Unlike the United Kingdom4 and United States5 during various points in 
the 20th century, Irish authorities did not employ revocation of naturalised citizenship as a legal 
tool to combat perceived subversion or terrorism. However, similar to other common law 
 
3 Damache v Minister for Justice and Equality [2020] IEHC 444 at [4]-[19]. Damache (HC). 
4 Patrick Weil and Nicholas Handler, ‘Revocation of Citizenship and Rule of Law: How Judicial Review Defeated Britain's 
First Denaturalization Regime’ (2018) 36 Law and History Review 295. 
5 Patrick Weil, The Sovereign Citizen: Denaturalization and the Origins of the American Republic (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012). Weil charts the use of denaturalisation by federal authorities to combat ‘unamerican’ political activity between 
1906-1967. Naturalised citizens could be denaturalized for speaking out against the U.S. government, participating in certain 
political organizations, or taking any action suggesting a lack of “attachment” to the U.S. Constitution. Denaturalisation was 
largely rendered unconstitutional by the Chief Justice Warren-era Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
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countries like Australia6 and Canada,7 Irish officials have recently moved to revive these 
provisions and the prospect of revoking the citizenship of citizens perceived to have been 
disloyal to the polity; disloyalty being linked to providing support to, or fighting for, designated 
terrorist groups. While such policies are criticised by some commentators for creating two-tier 
systems of citizenship (secure for citizens of birth and insecure for naturalized citizens) and a 
risk of statelessness contrary to international law,8 many countries clearly see them as a useful 
means to facilitate the deportation, or prevent the re-entry of, those considered a threat to the 
polity. The intent to revoke issued to Mr. Damache thus marked the beginning of judicial 
exploration of what was hitherto uncharted legal territory. 
 
PART II 
HIGH COURT JUDGMENT 
Mr. Damache swiftly issued judicial review proceedings on several grounds to challenge the 
legality of the revocation process in the 1956 Act and to prevent the process from proceeding 
to a final decision.9 Before the High Court the applicant argued that s.19 of the 1956 Act was 
incompatible with articles 6 of the ECHR, as incorporated into Irish law by the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003; that it was in breach of Articles 41 and 47 of the 
European Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and was contrary to the principle of 
proportionality established in the Case C-135/08 Rottman line of jurisprudence.10 The applicant 
also advanced two arguments against s.19’s constitutionality. First, the applicant argued the 
revocation of citizenship was a judicial power and, as a result, could only be constitutionally 
exercised by the judiciary and not the executive branch. The applicant argued that the gravity 
of a revocation of citizenship was analogous to other core judicial functions, like the 
determination of criminal liability and subsequent imposition of a penalty. Given its severity, 
such a decision could only be constitutionally determined and imposed by an actor possessed 
of the judiciary’s impartiality, independence, and adherence to rigorous process.11 Second, the 
applicant argued s.19 was in breach of constitutional fair procedures by failing to provide an 
independent and impartial decision-maker. Counsel for the applicant argued the fact the 
Minister could make a proposal to revoke, defend his decision before an independent tribunal, 
and then make the ultimate call on whether to uphold his initial proposal, was a breach of this 
requirement.12 
 
The High Court rejected all the applicant’s arguments. In respect of the ECHR claims, 
Humphreys J. held that Article 6(1) did not apply to decisions of a public law nature, but only 
 
6 Leslie Eastbrook, ‘Citizenship Unmoored: Expatriation as a Counter-Terrorism Tool’ (2016) 37 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law 1273. 
7 Audrey Macklin, ‘Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien’ (2014) 40 Queens 
Law Journal 1. Canadian citizenship stripping legislation was repealed after three years in 2017. See Sangeetha Pillai and 
George Williams, ‘The Utility of Citizenship Stripping Laws in the UK, Canada, and Australia’ (2017) 41 Melbourne 
University Law Review 846, 871. 
8 Matthew Gibney, ‘Should Citizenship be Conditional? The Ethics of Denationalization’ (2013) 75 The Journal of 
Politics 646. 
9 Damache (HC) n3 above at [19]. 
10 ibid. at [19]-[20]. 
11 ibid. at [44]. 
12 ibid. 
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to ‘criminal proceedings and “civil rights” in the European sense, that is private law rights’.13 
Humphrey J’s concluded Article 6(1) ‘was not intended to govern administrative decision 
making’ but that even if it did apply, same ‘would be satisfied in any event by searching judicial 
review which is available to the applicant if an adverse decision is made at some future point’.14  
 
The applicant’s Charter arguments were also given short shrift, with Humphrey J’s finding that 
Article 41 did not require judicial decision-making in all decision-making process and 
‘certainly not here’, and that Article 47 was  satisfied as an ‘effective remedy’ was ‘available 
here in the form of judicial review’.15 In respect of the claim that the Minister’s decision was a 
breach of the principle of proportionality, Humphrey J’s found that the applicant’s argument 
was effectively based on a category error which fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the 
Minister’s action. As Humphrey J’s put it, what was before the Minister was ‘only a proposal, 
not a decision’ with adverse legal consequences and thus not suitable for proportionality 
review.16 
 
Finally, the applicant’s constitutional arguments were both rejected. Humphrey J’s first found 
that the revocation of citizenship ‘is clearly not’ a judicial function but ‘well within the core of 
the executive function to decide on the grant or revocation of citizenship and, subject to 
legislative regulation’.17 Humphrey J’s based this conclusion largely on a historical mode of 
argument, putting considerable weight on the fact there was ‘never any judicial involvement in 
the making of such decisions (as opposed to their review) as a matter of Irish or UK legal 
history.’18 For Humphrey J’s, it would be akin to a ‘power grab without precedent for the 
judicial branch of government to arrogate to itself the power to make the decision on as opposed 
to supervising the legality of such a process.’19 
 
Humphrey J’s also definitively rejected the fair procedures argument partly on the grounds it 
was premised on the ‘fundamental misconception’ that s.19 concerned a ‘judicial or quasi-
judicial function.’20 Although the authority in s.19 concerned an executive function it was, 
Humphrey J’s accepted, of course still subject to the requirement to act consistent with fair 
procedures. But this did not mean it was subject to the same panoply of procedural safeguards 
parties might enjoy in an adversarial judicial process, such as a neutral umpire or right of appeal 
to an entirely independent appeals body. In respect of the perceived risk of bias stressed by 
applicant’s counsel, Humphrey J’s found the concerns raised were based on conjecture. There 
was no reason to suggest, the judge held, that the Committee who would hear submissions on 
revocation from both the Minister and applicant would be biased in the Minister’s favour. 
Additionally, Humphrey J’s found that combination of the presumption of Constitutionality,21 
 
13 ibid at [54]. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid at [66]. 
16 ibid.  
17 ibid. at [36]. 
18 ibid.  
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. at [45]. 
21 ibid. at [51]. 
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the fact any ‘administrative decision-maker had to act in accordance with fair procedures’,22 
and the availability of judicial review, were important contextual considerations which should 
all serve to dispose of the ‘fear of actions that would be contrary to due process.’23 In other 
words, for Humphrey J’s the process provided for in s.19 was both structurally sound from the 
perspective of the level of fair procedures constitutionally required for an executive function, 
and eminently able to deal with any abusive or capricious retail level applications of the 
statutory process through judicial review. In effect, for Humphrey J’s the entire basis of 
challenge on this ground was premature and based on anxious and pessimistic speculation 
about how an untested statutory process, one enmeshed in a web of robust public law principles, 
would function in practice.24 
 
The applicant appealed the judgment and was subsequently granted leave to bring proceedings 
directly before the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal.25 Leave was granted in 
respect of the appellant’s two constitutional arguments. First, on the basis the revocation of 
citizenship was a judicial power and could not be exercised by the executive. Second, that even 
if revocation was an executive function, that the process provided for in s.19 of the 1956 Act 
was a breach of fair procedures. The basis for the fair procedures claims before the Supreme 
Court again focused on the perceived structural problems of s.19: that it ensured that the 
Minister was the official who both initiates the revocation process and confirms whether 
revocation should proceed. Crucially, argued the appellant’s counsel, the Minister only had to 
consider the recommendations of the independent Committee but was not bound by them, and 
was free to depart from them in deciding whether to confirm or rescind a denaturalisation 
proposal. The appellant argued the dominant ministerial role at both ends of the statutory 
process - in initiating the revocation proposal and making the decision to confirm or revoke it 
- gave rise to structural risks of bias and pre-judgment.  
 
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT 
In relation to the appellant’s first point, the Supreme Court held that the revocation of 
citizenship was not an aspect of the judicial power constitutionally reserved to the judicial 
branch, but an executive power. In doing so, the Court placed emphasis on the fact this 
authority has long been considered an executive function in common law systems with a shared 
understanding of executive power rooted in British constitutional history and the royal 
prerogative.26 The leading case for determining whether a power or function constitutes an 
aspect of the administration of justice is McDonald v. Bord na gCon.27 In McDonald Kenny J. 
outlined five features said to be characteristic of the administration of justice reserved to the 
judiciary by Article 34 of the Constitution. These include: 
 
1, a dispute or controversy as to the existence of legal rights or a violation of the law; 
 
22 ibid. at [41]. 
23 ibid. at [51]. 
24 ibid. at [67]-[68]. 
25 The Supreme Court issued its determination granting leave to appeal in Damache v. Minister for Justice [2019] IESCDET 
254. 
26 Damache (SC) n2 above at [72]-[73]. 
27 [1965] I.R. 217, 230-231. 
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2, The determination or ascertainment of the rights of parties or the imposition of liabilities or 
the infliction of a penalty; 
3, The final determination (subject to appeal) of legal rights or liabilities or the imposition of 
penalties; 
4, The enforcement of those rights or liabilities or the imposition of a penalty by the Court or 
by the executive power of the State which is called in by the Court to enforce its judgment; 
5, The making of an order by the Court which as a matter of history is an order characteristic 
of Courts in this country.” 
 
The Supreme Court placed very heavy emphasis on the fifth criteria – whether the kind of order 
at issue has historically been associated with the judicial branch.28 The Court accepted the 
Respondent’s submission that as a historical matter, control of the entry, stay, and exit of aliens 
from the State was a matter for the executive - both in Ireland and the UK. The issue of 
naturalisation and revocation in the UK was similarly accepted to be a matter for the executive. 
In the Court’s understanding of UK practice, while naturalisation and denaturalisation were 
issues subject to parliamentary regulation, it was ‘never…the role of the courts to make such 
decisions.’29 The Court also cited30 with approval dicta from the Irish Court of Appeal 
judgment in Habte v. Minister for Justice31 which dealt with revocation in the context of fraud. 
The Court of Appeal in Habte found that the fact ‘courts have historically had no role in the 
decision to revoke citizenship’ in the UK constitutional order is consistent with the general 
dominant ‘role of the Executive in relation to the entry, residence and exit of foreign 
nationals’.32 The Supreme Court also endorsed the Court of Appeal’s subsequent observation 
in Habte that there was nothing in the text of the 1937 Irish ‘Constitution to suggest that any 
aspect of this function, “drastic” in its effect or not had been transferred to the judicial 
branch.’33 
 
In relation to the second argument, the Court began by accepting that due to the severe 
consequences revocation of citizenship may have for a person – including loss of EU 
citizenship, loss of access to a passport and consular assistance, the right to vote, and the risk 
of deportation – a very high standard of procedural safeguards must apply.34 The Court 
accepted the State’s submission that there was no reason to suggest that the Committee referred 
to in s.19 would be anything other than independent in considering the appellant’s submissions. 
The Court accepted ‘there is nothing to suggest that the members of the Committee have any 
prior involvement in the matter and there is no suggestion that they have any interest in the 
outcome of the inquiry.’ There was thus no breach of fair procedures on this basis.35  
 
28 Damache (SC) n2 above at [66]-[69]. 
29 ibid. at [67]. 
30 ibid. at [72]. 
31 Habte v. Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 22. at [129], per Murray J.  
32 ibid. 
33 ibid.  
34 Damache (SC) n2 above at [27] 
35 ibid., at [123]. 
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However, the Court went on to find the process provided for by s.19 still did not provide the 
safeguards required to meet the high standards of fair procedures applicable to a person facing 
such severe consequences, because the Minister both initiates the proposal to revoke and makes 
the final decision after hearing from the independent committee, depriving the person subject 
to the proposal of an ‘impartial and independent decisionmaker.’36 The Court contrasted the 
process in s.19 unfavourably with the statutory process the UK operated for revocation prior 
to reforms introduced in 2002.37 Under this former process38 a proposal to revoke citizenship 
originated from the Secretary of State, and arguments for revocation would then be made on 
his behalf by the Treasury Solicitors before an independent Committee composed of persons 
with judicial experience. These arguments would be heard along with arguments against 
revocation from the person concerned. Having heard both sides, the Committee would 
subsequently issue a recommendation on the proposal. In the Court’s understanding of this 
process, following the hearing of submissions from both sides, the recommendations of the 
Committee ‘were binding on the Secretary of State.’39 However, the Court also accepted that 
the views of the Committee were not in fact legally binding on the Secretary of State. Rather, 
a ‘practice’40 developed overtime where the recommendations of the Committee were 
‘considered’41 to be binding by the executive. 
 
The Court also said it was ‘useful to contrast’ the process in s.19 to the Irish statutory regime 
for international protection applicants. Under this regime, applicants are entitled to an 
examination of their application for asylum at first instance by an independent international 
protection officer. If they are unsuccessful, there is also right of appeal to an equally 
independent Tribunal. If successful at either stage the Minister is ‘required to give a declaration 
of refugee status save in exceptional circumstances provided for in s. 47(3) of that Act such as 
the person being a danger to the security of the State.’42  
 
The citizen facing a proposal to revoke a certificate of naturalisation, the Court pointed out, 
did not enjoy the same level of procedural safeguards as this regime as they critically did not 
enjoy an ‘impartial and independent decisionmaker’.43 As the Court framed it:  
 
The person who starts the process is the Minister. Where there is a Committee of 
Inquiry, his representatives present the reasons for the proposed revocation and the 
evidence to support it. Although the Committee reports its findings to the Minister, 
the Minister has made it clear that the findings of the Committee are not binding on 
him. The same person who initiated the process, whose representatives make the case 
 
36 ibid. at [128]. 
37 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002), chapter 41. 
38 Outlined in fascinating detail by Weil and Handler. See generally n4 above. 
39 Damache (SC) n2 above at [127]. 
40 ibid. at [80] 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid., at [128]. 
43 ibid. 
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for revocation before the Committee of Inquiry (where it is sought) ultimately makes 
the decision to revoke.44 
 
For failing to provide a kind of binding impartial and independent decisionmaker like the 
above-mentioned regimes, the Court declared s.19 repugnant to the Irish Constitution.  
 
 
PART III COMMENTARY 
 
Supreme Court’s treatment of fair procedures  
Much of the Court’s treatment of fair procedures was uncontentious. It is now axiomatic in 
Irish law that the executive is not free to exercise either its inherent or statutory power in an 
arbitrary manner which would effectively dispense with the duty to respect precepts of fair 
procedures,45 an unenumerated constitutional right housed in Article 40.3.46 This is the case 
even in the context of immigration decisions which implicate sensitive policy issues, like those 
pertaining to national security.47 Finding that the reach of fair procedures extends into the 
process of citizenship revocation was thus entirely unsurprising. Much more contentious, 
however, was the Court’s translation of the abstract requirement to respect fair procedures into 
its concrete demands in this case. One can summarize the problem with the Court’s treatment 
of fair procedures with one word: blinkered.  
 
Fair procedures is an amorphous legal concept, whose diverse bundle of entitlements – the 
right to notice, to be heard, the right to an oral hearing, to have the assistance of legal counsel, 
and to have an impartial and independent decision maker etc – are typically balanced alongside 
competing principles and institutional goods by officials; whether it be promoting 
administrative efficacy in the pursuit of substantive socio-economic goods, respecting 
democratic choices expressed in legislation, or respect for structural commitments stemming 
from the separation of powers.48 Judicial desire to balance and calibrate these kinds of 
competing principles and goods helps explain why Courts often find the demands of fair 
procedures cannot be regarded as rigid, but will vary depending on context,49 including the 
gravity of the interests or rights at play, and the presence or absence of the above kinds of 
principles and goods. Indeed, in some constitutional systems, recognition the demands of fair 
procedures implicate many other important competing considerations, has even spurred calls 
 
44 ibid.  
45 David Kenny, ‘Fair Procedures in Irish Administrative Law: Toward a Constitutional Duty to Act Fairly’ (2011) 34 Dublin 
University Law Journal 47-73, 47-48. 
46 Article 40.3.1 provides that ‘The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and 
vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.’ The Courts have held one of these personal rights is an entitlement to fair 
procedures. Mallak v. Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 59, [2012] 3 I.R. 297. 
47 A.P. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESC 47. 
48 ibid., 394. 
49 For judicial discussion on the importance of context to the demands of fair procedures in the UK see e.g., Russell v. Duke 
of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109, at 118; Lloyd v. McMahon [1987] 1 A.C. 625, at 702, For Ireland see International Fishing 
Vessels Ltd v Minister for the Marine (No. 2) [1991] 2 I.R. 93 at 102; Shatter v. Guerin [2019] IESC at [28]-[32], per Charleton 
J.   
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for judicial doctrine extending deference to reasonable political branch determinations of what 
natural justice requires in different administrative contexts.50  
 
While Irish law lacks the latter kind of doctrine - of deference to administrators on the question 
of what fair procedures requires in a given scenario - the Irish Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasised that the demands of due process are deeply contextual, and that its requirements 
do not require ‘perfect, or the best possible justice’ but ‘reasonable fairness in all the 
circumstances.’51 For Irish Courts, the answer to what constitutes ‘reasonable fairness’ will 
differ widely depending on the scenario at hand, and it would be a ‘mistake to assume that a 
single one size fits all procedure must be applied’ and a ‘serious error, to which lawyers are 
prone’ to approach the question of fairness with the ‘tacit assumption that only procedures 
which approximate to a criminal trial are fair, and anything which departs from that is somehow 
dubious.’52 In other words, while an important constitutional entitlement, deciding what fair 
procedures demands in a given scenario is a contextual decision made in light of competing 
considerations.  
 
In stark contrast, Damache saw the Court effectively side-step their own prior pronouncements 
on the need to approach the demands of fair procedures via rigorous contextual analysis. The 
Court instead took a largely blinkered approach to the right to fair procedures by deciding to 
focus on protecting a single constitutional principle they felt threatened by the possibility of 
executive prejudgment and bias, all while down-playing or ignoring important competing 
considerations and principles. One consideration given short shrift was the availability of 
surrogate statutory safeguards already provided by the Oireachtas in s.19(3): including the right 
to be notified of the reasons for a revocation and right to make submissions to an impartial 
committee with judicial experience who would issue a recommendation to the Minister on 
revocation. Crucially, these statutory safeguards are also enmeshed in a dense web of robust 
administrative law principles which require any decision must be taken in good faith, factually 
sustainable, and be reasonable in its assessment and weighing of any relevant evidence 
(including the Minister’s acceptance or rejection of the independent committee’s 
recommendations) in light of the gravity of interests at play.53 As an EU member state, Irish 
officials are of course also bound by EU jurisprudence on citizenship revocation. Post-
Rottmann54 and Tjebbes55 it is clear member states must ensure that deprivation of national 
citizenship which also results in the loss of EU citizenship and its attendant rights – must be 
subject to a proportionality assessment.  
 
 
50 For a discussion and justification of this possibility in the US see Adrian Vermeule, ‘Deference and Due Process’ (2016) 
129 Harvard Law Review 1890, 1911-1919; for discussion of these issues in Canada see Simon Ruel, ‘The Review of 
Procedural Fairness Post-Vavilov: More of the Same?’ (2020) 33 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice159; 
Paul Daly, ‘Unresolved Issues after Vavilov III: Procedural Fairness’ Administrative Law Matters (7th May 2020). 
51 International Fishing Vessels Ltd v. Minister for the Marine (No 2) [1991] 2 IR 93 at 101. 
52 O’Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority and Ireland [2017] IESC 75 para. 46. 
53 The State (Keegan) v. Stardust Victims' Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642, 658; Meadows v. Minister for Justice 
[2010] IESC 3; [2010] 2 IR 701. 
54 Case C-135/08 Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern. 
55 Case C221/17 Tjebbes v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken. 
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As a result, any factually unsustainable, or abusive uses, of revocation power under this 
statutory process could be easily flagged in the recommendations of the independent 
Committee and open to correction via judicial review for unreasonableness or lack of 
proportionality. The Court’s conclusion s.19’s procedural provisions were systemically 
unsound from the perspective of fair procedures, due to a risk of bias, impartiality, and 
prejudgment etc. seems oddly detached from this rich jurisprudential context, and its concern 
at the fact the Minister was not legally bound by the recommendation of the Committee given 
undue weight.  
 
Indeed, the Court’s comparison between the operation of the pre-2002 UK statutory regime 
and the process in s.19 could, in fact, be cogently used as the basis for an argument against the 
Court’s ultimate decision to strike down the latter provision based on abstract concerns about 
how the statutory process might work. As just noted, the Court ruled against the process in s.19 
of the 1956 Act in abstracto partly based on the fact the Minister was not legally bound to the 
views of the independent Committee, all while giving minimal weight to how it might operate 
in practice. But it was precisely the de facto practical operation of the UK regime over time, 
not its formal statutory provisions, that produced the very process the Supreme Court clearly 
seemed to favour. As noted above, the Court itself accepted that the views of the independent 
Committee in the pre-2002 UK regime were never legally binding on the Secretary of State, 
but that a convention grew to the effect that the Secretary of State considered they ought to be 
regarded as such. Weil and Handler link this convention to the esteem its judicial members 
were held and the perception the Committee was a model of rigorous impartiality and 
independence whose views ought to carry decisive weight.56A similar convention, or 
presumption, may well have taken root here, given the similar nature of the proposed 
independent Committee in the Irish regime, had the Supreme Court but stayed its hand and let 
the statutory process operate for a time. 
 
More unfortunate than the minimal weight given to this rich jurisprudential context, however, 
was the impact of the Court’s approach to fair procedures on core separation of powers 
principles, which were simply not rigorously analysed. Article 28 of the Constitution 
emphatically vests ‘the executive power of the state’ in the Government, and only the 
Government or those acting on its authority can exercise it. The Irish Superior Courts have 
long held that the regulation of immigration – including the entry, immigration status, removal, 
or the granting of citizenship – is an inherent executive power which can be exercised by the 
Government without a statutory basis.57 As already noted, the Court’s theoretical basis for 
ascribing this power to the executive is largely based on a historical interpretation of Article 
28.2.58 The Court has reasoned that power to regulate immigration in Ireland pre-independence 
was one long exercised by the UK executive59 and that, as post-independence ‘the executive 
 
56 n 4 above, 307 & 340. 
57 Bode v. Minister for Justice [2008]3 1R 663; Laurentiu v. Minister for Justice [1999] 4 IR 27; C.A. v. Minister for Justice 
[2014] IEHC 532; XP v. the Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IECA 112. 
58 Which provides that ‘the executive power of the state shall, subject to the provisions of this constitution, be exercised by or 
on the authority of the Government.’ 
59 Association of authority to regulate immigration with the royal prerogative and executive branch has a long pedigree, with 
an extensive line of UK case law finding the prerogative extended to the regulation of the entry, stay, and exit of aliens and to 
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power’ of the Irish State now vests in the Irish Government constituted by Article 28, the latter 
now exercises this authority on behalf of the former.60 Despite this constitutional allocation of 
executive authority, the most straightforward reading of the Court’s articulation of the demands 
of fair procedures in this case means that the Minister cannot now both initiate and confirm a 
revocation proposal - ensuring that at least one of these executive responsibilities must be 
vested in another actor.  
 
Reading between the lines, it seems the Court would have been satisfied with the 
constitutionality of s.19 if the recommendations of the independent Committee were legally 
binding on the executive, so that her confirmation or dismissal of a revocation proposal became 
a statutory formality. In other words, what the Court effectively seems to be saying is that to 
constitute a lawful exercise of this executive function, an independent non-executive actor must 
take over a substantial portion of its exercise and be responsible for either the initiation, or 
confirmation of, a revocation proposal. This would likely involve the Oireachtas stripping this 
acknowledged executive function away from the Government and vesting it in what looks 
suspiciously close to judicial tribunal–lawyer led and with high levels of insulation from 
executive direction. Critically, however, the Court did not grapple with the troublesome 
question of whether such a move would be within the constitutional gift of the Oireachtas.  
 
The Irish executive's control of immigration policy is, like its UK counterpart, heavily 
regulated and shaped by statutory provision; and that case law in both systems accept this area 
of policy can be regulated by the legislature in a manner which cabins the ability of the 
executive to exercise its inherent executive/prerogative powers. In both legal systems, it is a 
bedrock principle of constitutionalism that executive power cannot be exercised in a way which 
would abrogate or frustrate a statute.61 The very crucial difference between Ireland and the UK 
in this area, however, concerns the constitutionally permissible extent to which statutes can 
regulate exercises of executive functions. In the United Kingdom, Parliament’s sovereignty 
means as a matter of legal principle it can legislate to displace royal prerogative powers 
exercisable by the Government, and theoretically divvy up these powers by statute and allocate 
them to whatever actors it sees fit.62 In contrast, in Ireland the Oireachtas is emphatically not 
sovereign,63 and its legislative competence is cabined by both constitutional structure and the 
requirement to respect constitutional rights. While the Courts have held the Oireachtas may 
 
the granting and withdrawal of passports to citizens. See R (Munir) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 
UKSC 32; R (Alvi) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 33; R (Pham) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2015] UKSC 19. 
60 Conor Casey, ‘Underexplored Corners: Inherent Executive Power in the Irish Constitutional Order’ (2017) 40 Dublin 
University Law Journal 1. 
61 It is a bedrock principle in both systems that the executive cannot act in a manner which would frustrate or disapply a statute. 
For recent affirmations of these principles see NHV v Minister for Justice & Equality [2017] IESC 35 and R v Miller [2017] 
UKSC 5. 
62 See Margit Cohn, Medieval Chains, ‘Invisible Inks: On Non-Statutory Powers of the Executive’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 97-122. 
63 Article 6.1 provides that ‘All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the 
people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, 
according to the requirements of the common good.’ Article 15.4.2 copper fastens this fact by providing that ‘Every law 
enacted by the Oireachtas which is in any respect repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, shall, but to the 
extent only of such repugnancy, be invalid.’ 
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certainly structure and regulate exercises of executive power via statute, the fact the control of 
immigration remains an executive function ensures the Oireachtas must also respect one of the 
core structural principles flowing from the Constitution’s separation of powers: that executive 
power cannot be alienated from the Government and given to another body.64 As a co-equal 
branch of State, the Oireachtas simply does not enjoy the same extent of constitutional 
authority to reorganize the executive and its functions as its British counterpart. 
 
This very different constitutional context and distinction should have been very important in 
the Supreme Court’s attempts to determine the concrete requirements of fair procedures the 
Minister had to follow to respect the Nemo Iudex principle on the one hand, with demands 
stemming from the text and structure of the Constitution’s separation of powers on the other.  
But the Supreme Court’s single-minded focus on the vindication of the Nemo Iudex principle 
meant it failed to grapple with the clear commitments of constitutional text and structure, and 
the practical impact of this failure may be to mandate the Oireachtas to enact a constitutionally 
objectionable statutory procedure, one which would de facto remove an acknowledged 
executive power away from the Government. The approach taken by the Supreme Court in this 
case might be justified by some as a brave and zealous vindication of the procedural rights of 
a small number of individuals at risk of a very serious, even life-changing, administrative 
decision. But whatever benign motivations might have spurred the Supreme Court’s approach, 
there is simply no avoiding the conclusion its vigorous protection of an abstract constitutional 
entitlement like fair procedures comes at the steep cost of disrespect for one of the 
Constitution’s very explicit textual commitments.  
 
Textual commitments aside, the Supreme Court’s judgment also likely means diluting 
accountability for profoundly morally and politically controversial exercises of executive 
power by requiring them to be hived off to a quasi-judicial body not answerable to the 
Oireachtas or people. Even more unfortunate is that this lopsided assessment took place in a 
context where the impugned statutory process already provided for robust procedural guards, 
whose efficacy was underpinned by a rich vein of administrative, constitutional, and EU 
jurisprudence that would have severely cabined the risks of capricious abuses of power at a 
retail level.  
 
Nemo iudex in causa sua – one important principle amongst many 
Nothing in this note should be taken as a critique of the Nemo Iudex principle. This principle 
is a bedrock element of fair procedures and constitutionalism; one whose roots run deep in the 
common law.65 It is a principle which can be justified on several compelling normative 
grounds: including respecting individual dignity, protecting the integrity of adjudication and 
administration, and the fact it is often necessary to respect the substance of constitutional rights 
if they are at issue in an administrative process.66  
 
64 See Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] I.R. 713; Pringle v Ireland [2012] IESC 47. 
65 For a classic articulation of the principle see Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.) 652; 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 
118a. Coke, C.J. found that a college of physicians given statutory powers to punish unlicensed medical practice could not 
act as “judges, ministers, and parties” simultaneously. 
66 See Conor Crummey, ‘Why Fair Procedures Always Make a Difference’ (2020) 83 Modern Law Review 1221-1245. 
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But the principle, notwithstanding its importance, is rarely treated as having unqualified scope 
in constitutional democracies. Instead, it is invariably explicitly or implicitly recognized by 
constitutional regulators67 that its concrete demands must be balanced and weighed against 
other, often competing, principles and goods important to constitutional democracy: including 
principles stemming from the separation of powers, democratic accountability, technocratic 
expertise, and institutional autonomy.68 Contemporary examples from constitutional 
democracies abound: legislatures frequently determine their own internal standing rules, 
salaries, and the boundaries of their electoral districts; judges frequently rule on the scope of 
their own jurisdiction and powers,69 if they ought to recuse themselves from a case, or hold 
parties in contempt; administrative agencies frequently enjoy authority to both make and 
enforce policies & regulations against private actors; and Attorneys General often provide 
sensitive legal opinions on the policies of the Government of which they are a member or 
subject to at-will-firing by.70 Such examples all risk, in one way or another, offending the rule 
against self-dealing embedded in the Nemo Iudex principle, but are nonetheless justifiable 
calibrations and qualifications on the principle given their critical importance to securing other 
important goals and principles like institutional autonomy, judicial independence, and 
administrative efficacy. While impartiality is thus sometimes a very important value in 
institutional design and setting the bounds of lawful administrative action, it is one which 
‘constantly trades off against and competes with other values’71 that should also be given their 
due.  
 
It goes without saying that making reasonable legislative and executive determinations which 
give due respect to the important, and often competing principles noted above, is not an easy 
task. As Vermeule puts it, these kind of ‘tradeoffs are hardly amenable to precise analysis’ and 
in such cases constitutional regulators must often ‘engage in an impressionistic balancing, with 
ill-specified weights, under conditions of grave uncertainty.’72 But notwithstanding this 
difficulty, it should be relatively easy to reject approaching the Nemo Iudex principle, and fair 
procedures generally, in a manner which allow them to uncritically trump important competing 
principles and values, instead of being appropriately calibrated and qualified in light of them;73 
just as it is equally important to avoid the converse analytical extreme of permitting concern 
for democratic accountability or administrative efficacy to jettison consideration of fair 
procedures.  
 
All of which is to say that it is preferable and sensible for constitutional actors to avoid a blunt 
approach to fair procedures which neglects to consider appropriate trade-offs or balancing 
 
67 By constitutional regulator I adopt Vermeule’s description as ‘any actors who make constitutional rules, whether at the stage 
of constitutional design or at the stage of constitutional “interpretation” and implementation.’ Adrian Vermeule, The 
Constitution of Risk (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 3. 
68 Adrian Vermeule, ‘Conta Nemo Iudex in Causa Sua: The Limits of Impartiality (2012) 122 Yale Law Journal 384, 416. 
69 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal (2006) 1400-1401. 
70 Adrian Vermeule, ‘Conta Nemo Iudex in Causa Sua: The Limits of Impartiality (2012) 122 Yale Law Journal 384, 387-
388. 
71 ibid., 389. 
72 ibid., 400. 
73 ibid., 389.  
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between competing constitutional principles at all. Unfortunately, this is precisely the 
unqualified approach the Supreme Court opted for through its application of the principle, one 
which paid insufficient regard to other critically important principles like the separation of 
powers and democratic accountability in the process. The Court’s choice in Damache should, 
in the end, not be regarded as a conflict between fundamental values of due process and an 
executive entitlement to abandon fair procedures; but between an interpretation of the 
requirements of due process that is sensitively attuned to and qualified by a wider constitutional 
context and one which is not. How the Government will respond to what represents, I suggest, 
an unwarranted incursion into their constitutional domain, remains to be seen. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The main takeaway from this critical analysis of Damache, for both Irish and comparative 
lawyers, is this: constitutional regulators ought not to be blinkered when translating the 
demands of an abstract constitutional principle like fair procedures into concrete 
determinations. It is an important constitutional principle to be sure, but one whose bundle of 
entitlements – the right to notice, to be heard, the right to a hearing, and to have an impartial 
and independent decision maker not prone to engaging in self-dealing etc. – must be balanced 
by and weighed alongside competing constitutional principles and institutional goods, whether 
it be promoting administrative efficacy in the pursuit of substantive socio-economic goods, 
respecting democratic choices expressed in legislation, or structural commitments stemming 
from the separation of powers.74  
 
In some systems, this recognition has spurred calls to offer judicial deference to reasonable 
determinations of what the principle demands in a given context, instead of engaging in de 
novo review of its requirements.75 Whether Irish Courts should adopt some version of this 
doctrinal approach, or whether such doctrines are desirable in general, is far beyond the scope 
of this note. But for now, it suffices to conclude by suggesting that regardless of whether judges 
are debating if they should afford deference to the provision of fair procedures on the basis of 
reasonableness review, or engaging in de novo correctness review, myopia in vindicating fair 
procedures in either instance may harm other goods and principles equally, if not more 




74 ibid., 394. 
75 See n 50 above. 
